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BALDWIN V. EMI FEIST CATALOG, INC., 805,
F.3D 18 (2D CIR. 2015)
The decision in Baldwin is rooted in the history and
progression of the Copyright Act. As discussed below, two parties
entered into several agreements regarding the allocation of
copyright interests in the musical composition of "Santa Claus is
Comin' To Town" ("the Song").1 Due to the evolution of the
Copyright Act and various operative agreement developments,
termination rights became available for the author's heirs.2
Whether or not said termination rights were properly exercised is
something the court was required to determine. This decision is
important because it gives a broad overview of the advancement of
the Copyright Act and its implications on contractual agreements
for future copyrights. Of legal significance, this decision provides
precedent that allows § 203 rights to be exercised even in the event
of earlier assertion and withdrawal of § 304(c) termination notice.3
Further, this decision underscores the necessity that every author
understand the intricacies of termination rights, specifically when
and how to exercise those rights. Lastly, this outcome affects
future bargaining and dealing for copyrights; for example,
bargaining parties may need to contemplate and explicitly consider
future modifications to the Copyright Act.
I. BACKGROUND

A. Copyright Act Development
The Copyright Act has endured three major overhauls that
affected the instant agreement: the 1909 Act, the 1976 Act, and the
1998 Act. Under the 1909 Act, authors owned a copyright in their
4
work for twenty-eight years from the day the work was published.
Additionally, the author could renew their copyright for an
additional twenty-eight years.5 The renewal term was implemented
' Baldwin v. EMIFeist Catalog,Inc., 805 F.3d 18 (2d Cir. 2015).
2

Id. at 52.

1 Id. at 26-7.
4 Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075.
5 Id.
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to allow authors in poor bargaining positions to salvage value in
6
the copyright and renegotiate terms of the agreement.
The 1976 Act is considered to be a major overhaul of the
Copyright Act as a whole. 7 That Act eliminated the original
twenty-eight year term as well as the renewal term of twenty-eight
years for works created on or after January 1, 1978.1 Instead, those
works created on or after January 1, 1978, were subject to a single
copyright term lasting for the life of the author plus seventy years. 9
Works created before January 1, 1978 retained the original twentyeight year copyright term, but the renewal term was extended to
ninety-five years from the original copyright date.' 0
Further, the 1976 Act created termination rights, which
allowed authors or their heirs to terminate "the exclusive or
nonexclusive grant of a transfer or license of the renewal copyright
...executed before January 1, 1978.""l Section 304(c) termination
rights allow authors to terminate pre-January 1, 1978 grants of
copyright. 2 The termination could be invoked during a five-year
period, fifty-six years after the original copyright date or on
January 1, 1978, whichever is later. 3 The use of termination rights
are subject to advance notice given to the grantee, which shall not
be less than two years or more than ten years before the end of the
fifty-six year term. "
Section 203 termination rights allow author to terminate
post-January 1, 1978 grants of copyright. 5 The termination right
can be used thirty-five years after the grant's execution. 6 If the
grant includes the right of publication, then that five year period
begins either thirty-five years from the work's publication, or forty

6

Stewartv. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 218-20 (1990).

7 Baldwin, 805 F.3d at 19.
8 Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541.

9 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012).
10 § 304(a), (b).
11 § 304(c).
12

§ 304(c)(3).

13 Id.

§ 304(c).
15 § 203.
16 Id.
14
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years from the grant's execution, whichever is earlier. 7 Post-1978
grants have the same termination notice requirement as pre-1978
termination rights.18
Lastly, Congress enacted the 1998 Act, which retroactively
extended any copyright already within its renewal term of seventyfive years from the original copyright date to ninety-five years
within the original copyright date. 9 In addition to the extended
term, authors or heirs could use termination rights if their earlier
rights had been both unused and expired. 2 ° These new termination
rights can be used any time during a five-year period beginning
2
seventy-five years after the original copyright date. '
B. Case Facts and ProceduralPosture
In a 1934 Agreement, the authors of the song "Santa Claus
is Comin' to Town", Coots and Gillespie, sold the copyright,
therein to EMI Feist's predecessor, Leo Feist, Inc. (hereinafter
"Feist"). 22 The 1934 Agreement contained provisions that required
Feist to publish the Song "in saleable form.., within one year" in
exchange for royalties. 2 3 The 1934 Agreement was formed under
the 1909 Copyright Act, which allowed authors to grant renewal
rights to third parties.2 4 In a 1951 Agreement, Coots granted his
renewal rights in the Song to Feist.25 Feist renewed the copyright
in the Song in 1961.26
Congress later enacted the 1976 Copyright Act, which
extended copyright protection to those works in its renewal term,
including the Song, to seventy-five years from the original date.27
After passage of the 1976 Act, the Song's copyright protection was
17

§ 203(a)(3).

18 §

203.

19 § 304(b).
20
21
22
23

§ 304(d).
§ 304(d)(2).
Baldwin, 805 F.3d at 19-20.
Id. at 20.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26 Id.
27 Id.
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set to expire in 2009.28 Additionally, the 1976 Act created
termination rights, where authors could terminate prior grants of
copyrights.29 Consequently, Coots served Feist's successor,
Robbins Music Corporation ("Robbins"), with notice of
termination (the "1981 Termination Notice") of the 1951
Agreement.3 0 Coots' attorney sent the 1981 Termination Notice to
the Copyright Office to be registered while negotiating a new
agreement with Robbins. 3 During negotiations, the two parties
struck a deal (the "1981 Agreement"), which granted the extended
copyright renewal term in the Song to Robbins in exchange for a
one hundred thousand dollar bonus and additional royalties.3 2 Due
to the 1981 Agreement, the 1981 Termination Notice was
rescinded and not recorded in the Copyright Office.33
Again, Congress revamped the copyright system and
passed the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (the 1998
Act).3 4 The 1998 Act extended the renewal term to ninety-five
years from the original copyright date, effectively extending the
Song's expiration date to December 31, 2029.15 Additionally, the
1998 Act allows expired but unused termination rights to be
revived, so long as it follows notice requirements.3 6 For example,
the author here must have exercised the right within a five-year
period beginning after seventy-five years from the original
copyright date.3 7
The 1998 Act allowed a large amount of authors and their
heirs, including Coots, to take advantage of the new termination
rights. 38 Coots' heirs were uncertain whether the 1981 Termination
Notice constituted use of termination rights under the 1998 Act, so
they filed and recorded a § 304(d) termination notice of the 1951
28
29
30
31

Id.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.

33

Id. at 22-3.
Id. at 23.

34

Id.

35
36
37

Id.

32

38

17 U.S.C. § 304(d) (2012).
Baldwin, 805 F.3d at 23.
Id. at 24.
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Agreement in 2004 (the 2004 Termination Notice).3 9 EMI Feist
("EMI"), Robbins' successor, thought the 1981 Agreement was
operative, and decided to negotiate with the heirs rather than refute
the notice.4 n During negotiations, the heirs' attorney thought the
agreement was more appropriately terminated under § 203, so the
heirs filed a § 203 termination notice in 2007 (the 2007
41
Termination Notice).
In 2009, Warner-Chappell Music, acting copyright
administrator for Coots' heirs, contacted EMI asserting that the
heirs had never used their termination rights to end the 1951
Agreement. 42 EMI claimed that § 304(d) termination rights were
unavailable to the heirs due to the 1981 Termination Notice. 43 In
2012, Coots' heirs served and recorded another § 203 termination
notice of the 1981 Agreement (the 2012 Termination Notice),
44
assuming the 2007 Termination Notice was premature.
On December 21, 2012, the heirs sought declaratory
judgment in the Southern District of New York to determine
whether the 2007 or 2012 Termination Notice will terminate
EMI's rights to the copyright in the Song.4 5 Both parties moved for
summary judgment, but the district court granted EMI's motion
and denied the heirs' motion. 46 The district court held that EMI's
rights in the Song derive from the 1951 Agreement, and because
that agreement is pre-1978, § 203 termination rights are
unavailable to the heirs. 47 Further, § 304(c) termination rights were
also unavailable to the heirs because they exercised their
termination rights via the 1981 Termination Notice and received a
substantial, additional economic term. 48 As a result, EMI owned

41

Id.
Id.
Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

Id.

45
46

Id. at 25.
Id.

47

Id.

48

Id.

39
40
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the copyright until its expiration in 2029. 49 The heirs filed a timely
50
appeal.

II.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Issues, Arguments, and Holding
1.

Whether EMI owns its rights in the 1951 or 1981
Agreement.

The heirs argued that, upon formation, the 1981 Agreement
superseded the 1951 Agreement and became the operative
agreement and derivation of copyright rights.5' EMI's argument
that the 1981 Agreement did not supersede the 1951 Agreement is
threefold." First, EMI argued that because Coots did not record the
1981 Termination Notice, the 1951 Agreement was never
terminated and remained in effect.53 Second, EMI argued that the
1981 Agreement only granted vested future terminable interests to
the heirs, while EMI still retained the other two interests in the
Song.14 Lastly, EMI argued that the 1981 Agreement did not
contain explicit language to the effect of replacing the 1951
55
Agreement.
2. Whether the 2007 or 2012 Termination Notice will
terminate the 1981 Agreement.
The heirs argued that they own a sufficient interest in the
termination rights of the Song, and the 2007 Termination Notice
complied with all regulatory procedures to be a successful
termination notice. 6 Therefore, the 2007 Termination Notice

49

Id.

50

Id.

51

Id.

52

Id.
Id. at 25-6.
Id. at 27.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 32.

53
54
55
56
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should terminate the 1981 Agreement in 2016.11 EMI made two
arguments against the proposition that the 2007 Termination
Notice terminates the 1981 Agreement. 8 First, EMI argued that the
author did not execute the 1981 Agreement, and therefore § 203
termination rights are unavailable to the heirs. 9 Second, EMI
argued that the publication of the Song was in 1990, and because
the 1981 Agreement is based on the premise that it covers
publication, the 2007 Termination Notice will not terminate the
1981 Agreement. 60 Instead, EMI advanced an alternative
calculation method for grants covering the right of publication, and
it claimed that the earliest the 1981 Agreement could be
terminated is 2021.61

3. EMI's rights stem from the 1981 Agreement, and the 2007.
Termination Notice will terminate the priorgrant.
a. EMI's rights stem from the 1981 Agreement.

The 1981 Agreement rescinded and replaced the 1951
Agreement, while also granting the heirs a vested future
terminable interest. 62 The court reasoned that if the parties intended
for the new agreement to be a substitute for the older agreement,
then it need not be explicit and can be implied for the latter
agreement to be replaced. 63 The court found that the parties
implicitly intended that the 1981 Agreement substitute the 1951
Agreement, and did not plainly convey the heirs a vested future
interest in the Song. 64 The 1981 Agreement, along with conveying
the heirs' vested future interest, contained very similar language to
the 1951 Agreement, which conveyed the same rights as the prior

57 Id.
58

Id.

59 Id.
60 Id. at
61

62
63
64

33.
Id.
Id. at 27.

Id.
Id. at 28.
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agreement.6 5 It would be nonsensical to have two grants coexisting
that convey the same rights, thus, by granting the exact same rights
EMI already owned and adding an extra term to the 1981
Agreement, the parties clearly intended for the 1981 Agreement to
replace the 1951 Agreement.66
b. The 2007 TerminationNotice will terminate the prior
grant.
The court determined that the operative agreement was the
1981 Agreement, and therefore, the heirs can terminate the
agreement via § 203 termination rights. 7 Contrary to EMI's
argument, the 1981 Agreement was agreed to by the author, and
therefore § 203 termination rights are available.68 Coots was
identified as the lone grantor and owned all termination rights
therein.6 9 Further, Coots' heirs could not have contracted away
their future interests at the time, as those rights had not yet
vested. 7 ° Additionally, publication did not occur in 1990 as
suggested by EMI, but instead occurred in the original 1934
Agreement.7' The 1934 Agreement covered the right of publication
when EMI's predecessor, Feist, originally agreed to "publish the
Song in saleable form within one year. 7 2 Therefore, publication
could not have occurred in 1990. 73 Lastly, the court did not address
whether the heirs could terminate the 1951 Agreement via § 304(c)
termination rights, which depended on if the 1981 Termination
74
Notice constituted exercising termination rights.

65

66
67
68
69
70
71
72

73

74

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id. at

28-9.
31.
32.

33.

32.
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Accordingly, the appellate court held that EMI's arguments
were without merit, and the district court's grant of summary
judgment for EMI was reversed."
III. FUTuPE
A.

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

Withdrawn § 304 Termination Notices Do Not Spoil § 203
Rights

This decision creates precedent that allows for § 203 rights
to be exercised even in the event of earlier assertion and
withdrawal of a § 304(c) termination notice.7" Unless the
termination notice is recorded, notice can be withdrawn and future
termination rights are preserved.77 An author's interest in .a
copyright does not again become possessory until the termination
notice is recorded.78 Therefore, until the Copyright Office records
the termination notice, the grant termination does not become
effective, and the author can still withdraw the termination notice
and preserve his or her terminations rights.7 9 Here, the 1981
Termination Notice was not recorded before execution of the 1981
Agreement, and therefore, the author's earlier assertion of § 304(c)
termination rights did not bar his heirs from effectively terminating
the 1981 Agreement via § 203 termination rights.8" This decision
allows authors to withdraw termination notice before recordation
and preserve termination rights for future use or further negotiate
for a better agreement.8'

75
76

Id. at 34.
Id. at 26-7.

77

Id. at 26.

78

17 U.S.C. § 304(c)(4)(A) (2012)

7' Baldwin, 805 F.3d at 26-7.
80 Id.
81

Id.
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B. Importance of Understandingthe Intricaciesof
Termination Rights

Understanding the nuances of the Copyright Act,
specifically termination rights, is of paramount importance for
artists. As evidenced in Baldwin, the outcome of the case hinged
on which agreement was found enforceable and operative. If the
operative agreement been found to be a pre-1978 grant of
copyright, the heirs may not have found recourse via termination
rights. Further, knowing when to submit a termination notice is
key in regaining value in the copyright. Here, the 2007
Termination Notice was found valid and enforceable, allowing the
agreement to terminate in 2016 rather than 2021.82 Had the 2007
Termination Notice not been filed in a timely manner, the heirs
would have lost five years of value in the copyright, as the next
served termination notice occurred in 2012. Lastly, it is important
to file the correct termination notice. Filing a § 304(c) notice of
termination is improper when the operative agreement is a post1978 grant and the result will be an ineffective termination notice,
possibly causing authors to miss the window of termination.
C. EMIRetains CopyrightOutside of the UnitedStates
Section 203 and 304 termination rights are only derived
from US law.8 3 As a result, EMI still has rights to the copyright
outside of the United States. This decision impacts future
agreement terminations because it only allows authors and heirs to
regain rights in United States copyright, not worldwide. This is of
particular importance in copyright-related issues that garner
worldwide reproduction, notoriety, and profitability--such as
music. For example, the authors and heirs would not receive 100%
of the profit for a Sync8 4 license for Santa Claus is Comin' to
Id. at 32.
17 U.S.C. §§ 203,304 (2012)
84 "[Sync license] subjects phonorecords to a compulsory licensing scheme that
authorizes any person who complies with its provisions to obtain a license to
make and distribute phonorecords of a nondramatic musical work." Leadsinger,
Inc. v. BMG Music Publishing,512 F.3d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 2008).
82

83
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Town, but rather only the share that properly reflects their US
rights. On the other hand, EMI would receive a share of profits
that properly reflects its worldwide copyrights in the Song.
Consequently, EMI's lessened copyright interest in the Song only
puts it in a proportionally less profitable situation than owning
copyright in the United States as well. Therefore, in similar
situations, the grantee may lose copyright in the United States, but
be nearly as profitable due to a large majority of profits flowing
from the rest of the world.
D. Future BargainingConsiderations
This decision, as well as the underlying agreements,
withstood several overhauls of the Copyright Act, and each time
the parties on both sides failed to foresee changes when dealing.
Several high profile copyrights, such as Mickey Mouse, are set to
expire soon. In the past, Disney has implemented extreme
lobbying efforts to keep Mickey Mouse from entering the public
domain.85 Consequently, the Copyright Term Extension Act of
1998 was passed to save Mickey Mouse and other high profile
copyrights from entering the public domain in the 1990s.86 With
Mickey Mouse's extension coming to an end on January 1, 202487,
it seems parties may have to be more forward-looking when
granting copyrights and negotiating terms. Given copyright's everchanging landscape, there is a real likelihood that further
legislation will be enacted. Additional modification of the
Copyright Act is likely to catch some bargaining parties off guard
by retroactively extending copyright terms, just as seen in
Baldwin.
One way bargaining parties can protect themselves from
future issues due to retroactive copyright extension is creating a
contractual condition antecedent. The provision can read that in
the event Congress retroactively extends copyright terms, the
85

Free Mickey Mouse: Copyright

Notice,

Derivative

Works, and the

Copyright Act of 1909, 2 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 254
86 Id.
87 Stephen Carlisle, Mickey's Headed to the Public Domain! But Will He Go
Quietly?, NOVA (2014), http://copyright.nova.edu/mickey-public-domain/.
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parties can either bargain for a new contract or continue the prior
agreement. The provision has several benefits: it gives both parties
an opportunity to protect themselves from being blindsided by
major congressional action; it allows parties to assess the current
contractual situation and, if necessary, devise a potential exit
strategy while providing a chance for both parties to bargain for a
better financial position.
E. IncreasedDealingsfor Works Made for Hire
A more practical and safe approach to contracting around
termination rights is for parties to deem the work a "work made for
hire." A work made for hire is where "the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author
for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all
of the rights comprised in the copyright.""8 When a work is
deemed work for hire, the person who creates the work is not
considered the author, and therefore, is excluded from the
Copyright Act and termination rights therein.89 If, for example,
record labels heavily negotiate for work for hire status on their
dealings with musicians then musicians will be unable to regain
value in their music later on. However, receiving work for hire
status from musicians would likely come at a larger upfront cost
than a standard grant of copyright. Record labels would need to
pay a premium for a work for hire because other record labels may
be willing to contract with the same musician at a standard grant of
copyright, where the musician would be able to retain some rights
in the song. To offset the benefits in retaining rights to the song,
and to make its deal for a work for hire more desirable, record
labels would need to increase monetary incentive for musicians. It
is difficult to determine how much record labels would be willing
to pay more for quasi-quiet title9" in copyrights, but front-loading
88

17 U.S.C. § 201(b)

89

Id.

90 Quiet title is when a property owner has good title to the property in question
and adverse claimants are barred from asserting competing ownership claims.
65 AM. JUR. 2d Quieting Title § 1.
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costs in return for copyright in a song may prove less costly when
considering the profound impact of termination rights on future
costs.
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